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Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of Overbook-
ing in the Airline Industry 
The airline industry, like many industries, is extensively regulated 
by a federal agency and a corpus of federal law and is also subject to 
numerous state laws and regulations. When conflict between the two 
is clear, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 
ensures that the federal law or regulatory agency action, if valid, will 
preempt any inconsistent state law. When conflict is less clear, as 
where the federal and state laws are arguably consistent or where 
federal intent to preempt is manifested by mere congressional or 
agency inaction, the preemption issue thus raised becomes considera-
bly more complex. 
Such complexity is common in the airline context, both because 
the Federal Aviation Act1 (FAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) do not purport to regulate all aspects of the industry and 
because airline activities are so varied that they come within the reach 
of numerous state statutory and common-law rules. This Note will 
consider the power of the CAB to preempt state law and thereby to 
insulate airline activities from state-law liability. It will suggest a 
framework for analyzing the problems of preemption by focusing on 
airline concealment of overbooking practices. Section I explains 
airline overbooking and demonstrates that concealment of overbook-
ing will often constitute common-law misrepresentation as that tort is 
usually defined. Section II, taking into account the most recent 
elaboration by the Supreme Court in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 
Inc.2, examines the CAB's general power under the Federal Aviation 
Act and establishes the tests used by the courts to determine whether 
state law is incompatible with the Act. It then considers what the 
CAB must do to make clear a specific intent to preempt state law. 
Section ill applies the analysis of section II to determine whether the 
CAB can insulate airlines from misrepresentation liability for conceal-
ment of overbooking practices and seeks to ascertain whether the 
CAB has actually attempted to preempt state law in this area. 
1. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). 
2. 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (U.S. June 7, 1976) (No. 75-455). In Nader, the Court 
decided only that the CAB did not have "primary jurisdiction" over the issues raised 
by concealment of overbooking. Still, the decision, particularly its construction of 
various statutes dealing with the powers of the CAB, is pertinent to the subject matter 
of this Note. 
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I. OVERBOOKING AND MISREPRESENTATION 
Overbooking, a practice common to all airlines, 3 occurs when an 
airline accepts more reservations for a particular flight then there are 
seats on the airplane. Deliberate overbooking is a response to the 
problem of "no-shows,"4 persons who reserve airline space but nei-
ther use nor cancel their reservations. Past efforts to deal with this 
problem have included ticketing time limits, reconfirmation require-
ments, 5 and the imposition of reservation service charges. These 
programs succeeded in reducing the number of no-shows, but cus-
tomer ill wil16 caused them to be abandoned in favor of the current, 
flexible system that allows airline customers to make reservations 
freely and to recover the full value of their fares if they do not use 
their reservations. -
Studying a flight's no-show history allows air carriers to predict 
future reservation turnover and no-show incidence and to employ 
controlled overbooking as a means of reducing the chance that a fully 
booked airplane will depart with empty seats. Thus, overbooking 
enables the airlines to utilize effectively the flexible reservation sys-
tem, 7 permits passengers who would not otherwise be accommodated 
on the flight of their choice to make confirmed reservations, and helps 
carriers to increase their load factor. 8 
However, deliberate overbooking inevitably results in instances 
in which more persons holding confirmed reservations appear for a 
flight than are predicted so that some must be denied boarding. 
Denial of boarding to individuals with confirmed reservations in such 
an "oversale" situation, commonly called "bumping," appears at first 
glance to be a statistically insignificant problem. There were 5 .4 
oversales per 10,000 enplanements in 1972 and 4.6 in 1973.9 In 
3. Initial Decision, CAB Docket 26253, Emergency Reservation Practices Investi-
gation, at 10 (June 10, 1974) [hereinafter CAB Initial Decision]. 
4. See Note, Court Usurpation of CAB Function: The Problem of the "Bumped" 
Passenger, 43 UMKC L. REV. 112 (1974). See also CAB Initial Decision, supra 
note 3, at 2. In December 1972, the industry total of no-shows per flight in a 
sample survey was 21.2 per cent. In December 1973, the figure reached 24.7 per cent 
The low for the year 1973 was 12 per cent in July. Id. appendix B, at 1. 
5. CAB Initial Decision, supra note 3, at 2. 
6. Id. at 2-3. 
7. Id. at 8-9: ''The successful growth and development of air transportation has 
been aided significantly by the flexibility of the industry's reservation practices and 
procedures which make airline services easily available to the public. The airline 
passenger has substantial freedom of choice to make reservations at carriers' offices or 
through agents and to cancel them by telephone or in person. Also, should a ticketed 
passenger have a change of plans, he is free in most situations to use his ticket on 
flights of other air carriers without endorsement." 
8. See Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs, and Reports of 
Unaccommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CAB Docket 16563, 
32 Fed. Reg. 459, 460 (CAB Order EDR-109 (1967)) [hereinafter Proposed Priority 
Rules]. 
9. Brief for CAB as Amicus Curiae, appendix B, at 50, Nader v. Allegheny 
Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae]. 
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absolute terms, however, the numbers are quite substantial-nearly 
83,000 persons were bumped in 1972 and approximately 76,000 in 
1973.10 In recognition of the inconvenience and hardship that can 
occur when persons who expect to board a flight are not allowed to 
do so, the CAB adopted rules that provide for compensation pay-
ments to individuals who are bumped.11 If accepted, this compensa-
tion constitutes liquidated damages for all injuries suffered by the 
passenger.1 z 
The CAB and the airline industry contend that overbooking is 
essential if the public is to enjoy flexibility in reservation practices.111 
Justification of controlled overbooking on such policy grounds, how-
ever, still leaves open the question whether airlines can legitimately 
continue to conceal overbooking practices from the public. Cur-
rently, the printed statements disseminated (according to CAB regu-
lations) to persons who have been bumped14 contain no mention of 
overbooking as a possible cause of the ticket oversale. The airlines 
themselves are more active in concealing the reasons why customers 
with reservations must occasionally be bumped. Thus, Eastern Air-
lines' company manual instructs its employees never to use the word 
"oversale" in a conversation within hearing distance of anyone other 
than Eastern employees.15 Similarly, the American Airlines manual 
states that "[i]f a passenger asks reason for oversale, tell him that the 
reason will be known only after an investigation has been conducted 
and all the facts are revealed."16 
The facts of a case just decided by the Supreme Court, Nader v. 
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,11 illustrate the plight of the bumped passen-
ger and provide a convenient framework for discussing the misrepre-
sentation issues raised by airline concealment of overbooking. In 
April 1972, Ralph Nader agreed to make several appearances on 
behalf of the Connecticut Citizen Action Group (CCAG), a public 
interest corporation. His principal appearances, designed to attract 
contributions and other support for the CCAG, were scheduled for 
April 28, 1972, beginning at noontime in downtown Hartford. On 
April 25, Nader reserved a seat for April 28 on an Allegheny Airlines 
10. Id. 
11. 14 C.F.R. § 250.5 (1975) (Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation 
Tariffs, and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers). 
12. 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1975). 
13. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8, at 460-61. 
14. See 14 C.F.R. § 250.9 (1975). 
15. Brief for Appellee at 30 n.13, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
16. Id. 
17. 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), revd. and remanded, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), revd. and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (U.S. June 7, 1976) (No. 
75-455). 
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flight from Washington to Hartford, and on April 28 he purchased his 
ticket from a travel agency and proceeded to the Washington Airport. 
Upon his arrival approximately five minutes before the flight's sched-
uled departure, Nader was informed by an Allegheny agent that it was 
full and that he could not be accommodated. As a result, Nader was 
unable to appear at the Hartford rally. At no time before the flight 
was he aware of the fact that Allegheny had intentionally overbooked 
his flight. Pursuant to CAB policy, Allegheny offered Nader denied-
boarding compensation, but he rejected the offer as inadequate and, 
instead, filed suit against the airline in federal district court alleging, 
inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation.18 
To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in most 
states, an individual must show (a) a false representation (b) in 
reference to a material fact (c) made with knowledge of its falsity 
(d) and with an intent to deceive (e) with action taken in reliance 
upon the representation.19 Although the factual circumstances in 
18. The district court entered a judgment for Nader, awarding him a total of ten 
dollars in compensatory and 25,000 dollars in punitive damages. 44 U.S.L.W. at 
4805. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, in what 
it considered an "application of the principles of primary jurisdiction, a doctrine 
whose purpose is the coordination of the workings of agency and court." 512 F.2d 
at 544. The court of appeals based its decision on a construction of section 411 of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), which reads: 
The Board may . . . investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign 
air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive prac-
tices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof. 
If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier, foreign 
air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or 
unfair methods of competition, it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, 
or ticket agent to cease and desist . . . . 
The court construed this section to mean that, if the Board "properly finds that a 
practice is not deceptive, a common law action for misrepresentation must fail as a 
matter of law." 512 F.2d at 544. It concluded that whether concealment of 
overbooking could be characterized as tortious conduct was a matter to be determined, 
in the first instance, by the CAB. 512 F.2d at 544. 
The Supreme Court reversed on the question of primary jurisdiction and remanded 
the case for consideration of the merits of the tort action. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4808-
09. It held that "[n]o power to immunize [carriers against common-law liability] 
can be derived from the language of § 411," 44 U.S.L.W. at 4806, and that "a 
violation of § 411 ..• is not coextensive with a breach of duty under the common 
law." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4807. Thus, the Court affirmed its earlier construction of 
section 411 in American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 
85 (1956) that CAB actions under this section are designed to protect the public 
interest rather than to punish wrongdoing or protect injured competitors. Since 
section 411 is "both broader and narrower than the remedies available at common 
law," 44 U.S.L.W. at 4807, a Board decision under that section would not be 
dispositive of common-law remedies. Moreover, since "[t]he standards to be applied 
in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the conventional competence 
of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be 
helpful," the principle of primary jurisdiction was inappropriate. 44 U.S.L.W. at 
4808. For a general discussion of primary jurisdiction, see K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE§ 19.08 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE 
AcnoN 122-40 (1965). 
19. See Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942); W. PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS§ 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). 
1204 Michigan Law Review [Vo1. 74:1200 
each case of "bumping" might vary the result, a scrutiny of Nader 
shows that airline concealment of overbooking practices can satisfy 
these elements of misrepresentation. 
A false representation may consist of a false or ambiguous state-
ment, a statement that is literally true but that creates a false impres-
sion in the mind of the hearer, active concealment of the truth, 
nondisclosure where there exists a duty to disclose, a half-truth, or 
nondisclosure of subsequently gained information that renders false a 
statement that was true when made. 20 Airline dealings with their 
customers concerning overbooking amount to false representations 
under several of these alternatives. 
An actual false statement may be involved since airlines confirm 
reservations knowing that their customers might be denied boarding 
because of overbooking. In Nader, Allegheny argued that it never 
represented to the public that a confirmed reservation constituted an 
absolute guarantee to a seat on a particular flight. 21 While he 
acknowledged that the possibility of weather and mechanical difficul-
ties precludes airlines from making such a guarantee, Nader contended 
that Allegheny's confirmation in effect promised him that factors 
over which the carrier did have control, such as reservation practices, 
would not cause a boarding denial. 22 This contention seems reasona-
ble23 and could well persuade courts to identify the confirmation of a 
reservation without disclosure of overbooking as a false representa-
tion. 
Such a reservation confirmation practice might also satisfy the 
false representation requirement as an example of "active conceal-
ment." Evidence of mere nondisclosure of overbooking by an airline 
will not suffice to show active concealment; there must be some 
showing that the airline deliberately attempted to minimize the possi-
bility that prospective customers would learn of the overbooking 
practice. In the Nader litigation, Allegheny's affirmative policy of 
instructing its employees to avoid mentioning the practice24 provided 
substantial evidence of just such active concealment. 
Mere nondisclosure satisfies the requirement of a false representa-
tion if the defendant owes a duty to disclose to the plaintiff. The 
federal district court in Nader concluded that airlines were under a 
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 694-96. 
21. See Brief for Appellant, appendix, at 20, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 
512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. 
22. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 26 n.11. 
23. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 44, 118-19. 
24. See id. at 95-96 (testimony of J. McDonald, passenger service representative, 
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.), id. at 128 (testimony of L.O. Barnes, President, Allegheny 
Airlines, Inc.); Allegheny Passenger Service Manual (August 15, 1970), at 4, 
reprinted in id. at 216-23. 
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duty to inform their potential passengers of overbooking practices, 25 
but the circuit court in effect vacated this decision by requiring that, 
in the first instance, the CAB must decide whether airline disclosure 
practices are fraudulent or deceptive. 26 Since the CAB has not yet 
decided whether airlines owe a duty to their customers to explain 
overbooking and its implications, 27 the circumstances of the airline-
passenger relationship must be examined to determine whether such a 
duty can be inferred. 
Even before the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 
1938,28 airlines, as common carriers, had special duties of disclosure 
to the public. This special status was recently reaffirmed in Fleming 
v. Delta Airlines,29 in which the court held that airlines owe their 
passengers "the duty to share with them information indicating . . . 
serious weather disturbances, so they can choose for themselves 
whether they are physically and emotionally capable of undertaking 
the trip and wish to do so."30 Although it has been argued that this 
particular duty only arises in the unique case in which nondisclosure 
keeps an individual ignorant of possible physical peril, 31 it can also be 
viewed as part of a generally greater duty to disclose that arises from 
the airline-passenger relationship. Granted, the relationship is not a 
fiduciary or confidential one32 for which courts demand "a standard 
of conduct above that of the ordinary marketplace where one is 
naturally more on his guard and less trusting of the other."33 Yet the 
airline-passenger relationship is certainly not an ordinary, arms-
length, marketplace transaction; the public is encouraged to place its 
confidence in the heavily regulated airline industry and in the CAB, 
which was established for the protection of the public interest.34 
Further, aside from the special duty of an airline that derives from its 
status as a regulated carrier, the duty to disclose might arise inde-
pendently from the airline's status as a vendor.35 It is at least arguable 
25. 365 F. Supp. at 132 ("a public duty and an especially large and high fiduciary 
obligation to make its policies known to all of its customers with regard to its 
intentional overbooking"). 
26. 512 F.2d at 544. 
27. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8. 
28. See generally 14 AM. JUR. Carriers§ 876, at 317 (1964). 
29. 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
30. 359 F. Supp. at 341. 
31. See Obde v. Schemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449,353 P.2d 672 (1960). 
32. See Note, ls the Duty to Disclose a Question of Fair Conduct, 2 IDAHO L. 
R.Ev. 112, 116 & n.22 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 697. 
33. Note, supra note 4, at 116. 
34. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 102, 1002(3), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 
1482(e) (1970). 
35. See American Natl. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S. 
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affd., 
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that the vendor-airline possesses knowledge of a material fact ( over-
booking) 36 and knows that its customers both act on the supposition 
that overbooking does not take place and do not have the opportunity 
to discover the truth about the practice. 37 It is worthwhile to note that 
in Nader, Allegheny's president actually conceded that passengers are 
entitled to notice of overbooking and its attendant risk. 38 
A final way in which airline dealings with customers can be 
identified as a false representation arises under an exception to the 
general rule that nondisclosure does not constitute fraud absent a duty 
to disclose. If after making a true statement a person acquires new 
information that makes the statement false or misleading, he must 
disclose that information to anyone who he knows is still acting on the 
basis of the original statement. 30 Thus, an individual who makes a 
confirmed reservation is generally assured of a seat on the plane 
(assuming that the flight is not already overbooked). If the flight is 
subsequently overbooked, the airline knows that individuals with 
reservations are no longer assured of seats since they all are exposed 
to the risk of being bumped. Arguably, airlines are then under a 
duty to inform their passengers of this new development so that the 
assurance implicit in the reservation confirmation will not be false or 
misleading. 
Once the existence of a false representation has been established 
under one of the available theories, the plaintiff must then show that 
the remaining four elements of the tort of fraudulent misrepr.esenta-
tion are present.40 As a general rule, a false representation is material 
if the fact falsely asserted or wrongfully suppressed would have 
influenced the plaintiff's judgment or decision had he known it. 41 
With the exception of the false representation requirement, this mate-
riality element will likely be the most difficult for bumped airline 
customers to satisfy. Nader succeeded by maintaining that he would 
have changed his plans had he known of the risk of being bumped, 42 
testimony that seems quite plausible since the time of his arrival in 
Hartford was of the utmost importance. In other cases, a plaintiff 
might attempt to satisfy the materiality requirement by asserting that, 
509 F.2d 1043 (1975); Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); 
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 697 •. 
36. See text at notes 41-43 infra. 
37. See testimony dted in. note 24 supra. 
38. Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 129. 
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 696-97 & n.32. On what constitutes a 
false or misleading statement, see Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. 
Mich. 1961); Smith v. Pope, 103 N.H. 555, 176 A.2d 321 (1961). 
40. See text at note 19 supra. 
41. See Lowe v. United States, 389 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 
912 (1968); Homelite v. Trywilk Realty Co., 272 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1959). 
42. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 25. 
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had he known of the overbooking and possibility of bumping, he 
would have reserved space on more than one flight. Airlines might 
respond that the prospect of being bumped could be found material 
only if the plaintiff had also viewed the prospect of weather or 
mechanical difficulties as material and had made contingency plans 
for those possibilities. This argument had little chance of success in 
the Nader case. Allegheny had a policy, known to Nader, of inform-
ing its customers of mechanical difficulties in advance, and the Wash-
ington-Hartford route was a well-traveled one for which Allegheny 
had back-up planes. 43 Moreover, Nader knew in advance of the 
flight that weather on the East Coast would likely pose no problems. 
Other plaintiffs, however, may have more difficulty countering this 
argument, particularly if their route is so infrequently traveled that 
back-up planes are unlikely, or if they were booked on a connecting 
or a long-distance flight and they made no advance check of the 
weather forecasts. 
Most bumped passengers should, like Nader, find it an easy 
matter to demonstrate the third element of misrepresentation, the 
airline's knowledge of the falsity of its representation. Airline 
officials are aware of overbooking practices and, as the Eastern and 
American manuals demonstrate, 44 also know that overbooking prac-
tices are being actively concealed. Indeed, it is unlikely that this 
issue will be contested. 
Similarly, bumped passengers should easily be able to demon-
strate that airlines intend to induce reliance upon the false statement 
or misleading omission. There is little question that airlines conceal 
overbooking to induce customers both to make reservations and to 
rely on the fact that they have reservations. In Nader, for example, 
Allegheny Airlines admitted that it hoped passengers would expect 
guaranteed seats when they were granted confirmed reservations. 45 
Airline customers should have difficulty satisfying the final re-
quirement, reliance upon the representation, only if they were aware 
of the airline's practice of overbooking before the bumping occurred. 
Reliance in the absence of such knowledge is not only reasonable but 
is expected by the airlines.46 The facts of Nader regarding the 
reliance issue were somewhat unusual. Nader had been bumped 
twice by other airlines (Eastern and American) during the six-month 
period preceding the Allegheny bumping and had received the printed 
statements concerning denied-boarding compensation required by 
the CAB regulations. 47 These prior incidents, Allegheny contended, 
43. See id. at 32. 
44. See text at notes 15-16 supra. 
45. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 119. 
46. See, e.g., id. 
41. See text at note 14 supra. 
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made Nader aware of the possibility of being bumped and thus 
precluded any reliance by Nader on his Allegheny reservation.48 
Nader had three arguments with which to counter this contention, 
arguments that should suffice for many other plaintiffs as well. First, 
since denied boarding may have causes other than overbooking, 40 
such as requisition of space by the government or reservation errors, 
being bumped once does not give an individual notice of overbooking 
practices. Second, the airlines refer to overbooking neither in their 
printed statements nor in their on-the-ground explanations to passen-
gers of the reasons for denied boarding. Finally, it cannot be pre-
sumed that an individual who knows that he has been bumped by one 
airline because of intentional overbooking practices also knows that 
other airlines engage in similar consumer abuses. 50 As the Supreme 
Court has stated: "[T]here is no duty resting upon a citizen to 
suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business."51 If 
overbooking is a dishonest consumer abuse, therefore, individuals in 
Nader's position should not be expected to impute dishonest over-
booking practices to airlines other than those with which they have 
dealt in the past. 
Thus, it appears likely that concealment of overbooking practices 
amounts to fraudulent misrepresentation under the tort law of many 
states. The remainder of the Note focuses on whether federal law 
and federal agency regulations can and actually do preempt state law 
in this area. Section II will determine general principles of preemp-
tion, in both the airline and a broader context, while section Ill will 
apply those principles to the overbooking practice. 
Il. CAB POWER TO PREEMPT STATE LAW 
Any inquiry into the preemption of state law by a federal agency 
such as the CAB must begin with a general examination of the 
powers delegated to the agency by Congress, since the parameters of 
an agency's preemptive capability are set by its enabling statute. G2 As 
a general rule, delegated powers are broadly construed and "are not 
limited to those expressly granted by the statutes, but include, also, all 
48. Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 20-21 ("Mr. Nader had no reasonable 
basis for believing that Allegheny's reservations practices with respect to overbooking 
would be any different than those of its two competitors with which he had so 
recently experienced being an oversale"). 
49. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 30. 
50. See Federal Trade Comm. v. Standard Educ. Soc,, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). 
51. 302 U.S. at 116. 
52. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 & n.22 (1944); Morrow v. Clayton, 
326 F.2d 36, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1963). See generally Note, The Preemptio11 Doctrine: 
Shifting Perspectives 011 Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 623, 
639-49 (1975). 
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of the powers that may fairly be implied therefrom."53 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has asserted that "the width of administrative authority 
must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was con-
ferred, "54 and has indicated that regulatory acts are to be given 
constructions that will enable the agencies to perform the duties 
required of them by Congress. 55 
The CAB has been charged with the responsibility of promoting a 
number of public interest goals, 56 including "the encouragement and 
development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the 
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the 
United States,"57 and "the promotion of adequate, economical, and 
efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges."58 The regula-
tory and rule-making authority that the agency has received59 to 
achieve these goals extends to such areas as the issuance of certificates 
·of public convenience and necessity, the granting of permits to foreign 
air carriers, the approval of rates for the carriage of persons and pro-
perty, the approval of consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of con-
trol of air carriers, inquiries into the management of air carriers, 
methods of competition, and loans and financial aid. An additional 
source of CAB power is section 411 of the FAA, which allows the 
Board to investigate possible unfair or deceptive practices in the airline 
industry and, if it finds such practices, to issue cease and desist or-
ders. 00 The remedies in section 411 are intended to supplement those 
contained in other applicable federal and state laws. 61 
53. Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36, 44 (10th Cir. 1963). 
54. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968). 
55. See Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 213 
(1912). See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sumner Financial Corp., 451 F.2d 
898 (5th Cir. 1971). 
56. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). 
57. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1970). 
58. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970). 
59. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 401 to 417, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371 to 1387 
(1970). The CAB also has the power to investigate and report on aircraft accidents. 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 701, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). 
60. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). See note 18 
supra. 
61. See note 18 supra. 
Such an interpretation of section 411 is consistent with the language of section 
1106 of the FAA, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970): "Nothing contained in this chapter shall 
in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, 
but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." It must be noted, 
however, that section 1106 should not be read literally to preclude the CAB from 
preempting state remedies in any areas. In Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene 
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the Supreme Court refused to accept such an 
interpretation for an identical clause in the Interstate Commerce• Act: "This clause 
• . . cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common law right, the 
continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of 
the act. • . . [T]he act cannot be held to destroy itself." 204 U.S. at 466. A more 
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It is clear in light of these broadly enumerated powers that the 
CAB has the capability to preempt virtually all state laws affecting 
the economic affairs of airlines and the airline-passenger relationship, 
so long as its action is consistent with the "public interest" of provid-
ing the public adequate transportation and allowing the airlines suffi-
cient revenue, and is not violative of specific FAA limitations or any 
other federal law. This conclusion only begins the inquiry, however, 
for the more difficult determination is whether or not the CAB has, in 
fact, preempted a particular state law. The remainder of this section 
examines three considerations that bear on this determination: first, 
what general standards the Supreme Court has employed to deter-
mine whether federal actions preempt state law in the absence of an 
express intent of Congress or the CAB to preempt; second, how these 
standards have been applied in the area of airline regulation to 
delineate federal and state spheres; and, finally, what procedural 
mechanisms the CAB can employ to evidence specific intent to 
override state law. 
In the absence of an express congressional or administrative 
agency intention to preempt state law, the courts have developed 
various approaches designed to determine the compatibility of state 
law with federal regulatory schemes. Basically, they have looked to 
the degree of conflict, actual and potential, between the federal and 
state laws and to "the peculiarities and special features of the federal 
regulatory scheme in question."62 
logical reading, and one that comports with the Court's preemption decisions, is that 
the provision disclaims any congressional intent to occupy the whole field of airline 
regulation, but does not reduce either the supremacy of federal law or the power of 
the CAB specifically to preempt state law in the course of regulating the airline 
industry. 
Another important provision of the FAA is section 414, which grants the CAB 
the power to exempt the airline industry in certain contexts from application of the 
federal antitrust laws. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 
(1970). This is a necessary adjunct to the CAB's power to approve agreements 
among air carriers and common carriers that affect air transportation. See Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970); Breen Air Freight, Ltd, v. Air 
Cargo Inc., 470 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1972). 
Finally, section 404(b) of the FAA forbids air carriers from establishing discrimi-
natory ratemaking and boarding policies. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49 
U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). The provision also limits the CAB and is perhaps the 
most significant express constraint on the CAB's powers contained in the FAA. See 
Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 14. Section 404 has been construed to 
create a private cause of action in favor of individuals who are victimized by 
unreasonable preferences or unjust discrimination as defined in the provision. See 
Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972). See 
also Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
62. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973). 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with preemption are difficult to organize in a 
conceptually sound manner, for the facts of each case loom large and the intent of 
Congress rarely is so clear as to excuse the courts from weighing policy considera-
tions. Generalizations, accordingly, are difficult to make, and the lessons of one area 
of substantive law are not easily transferred to other areas. 
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For many years after the Supreme Court's decision in Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 63 the judiciary found a strong presumption in favor of 
federal, rather than state, interests and was willing to find preemption 
when the nature of the federal regulation seemed to call for it, 64 
despite the absence of clear congressional intent to occupy the field or 
of any actual conflict. The Court found preemption during this 
period whenever the congressional regulatory design allowed for such 
an inference65 or whenever the state law was in potential conflict 
with the federal legislation. 66 In Farmers Educational & Coop-
erative Union of America v. WDAY, lnc.,67 the Court held that 
provisions of the Federal Communications Act68 prohibiting censor-
ship of political broadcasters immunized broadcasters from state libel 
laws, despite the absence of evidence of legislative intent to occupy 
the field and the absence of serious conflict. According to the Court, 
factors extrinsic to the Act and considerations of fairness to broad-
casters required invalidation of state law as applied to individuals 
embraced by the Act. 69 
Since 1973, the Court has altered its standards for inferring 
congressional intent to occupy a field and has required that preemp-
tion be based on a more definite showing of inconsistency between 
federal and state provisions. In New York State Department of 
Social Services v. Dublino,70 the Court made a significant break with 
the solicitude for federal law manifested in Hines and its progeny: "It 
will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede 
the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifesta-
tion of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not 
lightly to be presumed."71 In dictum, the Dublino Court also re-
phrased the test for determining whether an apparent state-federal 
conflict will effect a preemption: "Conflicts, to merit judicial rather 
than cooperative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and 
63. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
64. See Note, supra note 52, at 630-39. 
65. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963). 
66. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
67. 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
68. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). 
69. 360 U.S. at 531-35. Solicitude to a federal regulatory scheme was also shown 
in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees 
of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), involving a suit brought by a former 
labor union member seeking damages for his allegedly wrongful suspension from the 
union and for his resulting loss of employment. From the structure of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970), and the active role played by the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in developing a substantive law governing 
labor relations, the Court concluded that state jurisdiction over the unfair practice 
claim had been preempted. 403 U.S. at 290. 
70. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
71. 413 U.S. at 413, quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). 
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not merely trivial or insubstantial."72 In a similar departure from its 
previous approach, the Court in Goldstein v. California73 (involving 
an alleged inconsistency between a California copyright statute and 
the copyright clause of the Constitution) announced that, in the 
absence of any actual conflict, federal law occupied a field and 
preempted state law only when the matter was "necessarily national in 
import" and such that conflicts would be inevitable, not merely 
possible.74 
In the CAB context, then, the preemption standards of Goldstein 
and Dublino require a three-fold inquiry. The first determination is 
whether there exists a conflict of some substance between the state 
law at issue and some valid federal regulation. The second is whether 
the area regulated is of such- national import and conflicts are so 
inevitable that the state law cannot be allowed to stand even though 
no present conflict exists. Neither of these determinations, of course, 
places significant reliance on express congressional or CAB intent. 
The third determination is whether the CAB has preempted the state 
law by manifesting a clear intent to do so. Of course, the CAB can 
preempt state law in this third manner only if its approval of the 
airline activity being regulated or prohibited by the state is consistent 
with the public interest. 
Although the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine has changed 
recently, its prior decisions in the field of airline regulation remain 
indicative of the Court's view concerning the proper spheres of federal 
and state law. The cases indicate that, under either the Hines or 
Dublino standards, federal law overrides all state laws or regulations 
that affect the timing, scheduling, or patterns of flights. Moreover, 
federal law governs the contractual obligations of the airlines and the 
quality of the services that airlines must provide, subject to the 
condition that contractual terms approved by the CAB are in the 
public interest. Finally, the cases show that state law controls both 
the imposition of property taxes on the airlines and tort liability of 
airlines, except where overridden by a particular federal enactment or 
by a CAB regulation that furthers some substantial public interests. 
The preemptive impact of the FAA in the sphere of regulating the 
scheduling and operations of flights was demonstrated in City of 
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, lnc.,75 in which the Court invali-
dated a municipal noise-control ordinance forbidding jet aircraft from 
taldng off from a local airport during certain nighttime hours. The 
Court's decision drew upon ambiguous evidence that the FAA was 
intended to preempt state and local noise abatement measures, but 
72. 413 U.S. at 423 n.29. 
73. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
74. 412 U.S. at 554 (emphasis original). 
75. 411 U.S. 624 (1973 ). 
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rested principally upon "the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal 
regulation of aircraft noise."76 The Federal Aviation Act, as amended 
by the Noise Control Act of 1972,77 vests .the CAB with the power 
to promulgate noise regulations and controls, the power to modify, 
suspend, or revoke aircraft operators' certificates for violations of the 
provisions, and the power to regulate takeoff and landing procedures, 
which includes authority to impose local curfews. 78 The Court inti-
mated that the exercise of these powers requires a delicate balancing 
of the interests of those on ground and the need for safe and efficient 
airline service, a balancing that local governments cannot conduct 
properly. 79 The effect of the local ordinance was to regulate the 
scheduling of air flights and to increase unsafe flight congestion in the 
hours immediately preceding the beginning of the daily curfew. This 
effect, the Court asserted, was inconsistent with the objectives of the 
federal statutory and regulatory scheme. 80 
The importance of Burbank extends beyond its limited holding 
concerning local noise ordinances if it is read alongside section 1108 
of the FAA, which makes clear that the navigable airways are part of 
the federal domain and subject to exclusive federal authority.81 The 
Court's emphasis on the effect of the Burbank ordinance on flights 
traveling in that airspace suggests that the exclusive federal power 
over the airways extends to ground activities that necessarily affect the 
scheduling and operation of flights. Although the Burbank decision 
deviates in language from the standards set forth in Goldstein and 
Dublino, its finding of preemption seems reasonably consistent with 
the results in those cases, since local ordinances of the type at issue 
will inevitably interfere with CAB flight scheduling efforts. 
Lower court decisions suggest that the terms of the airline-passen-
ger contract are also determined entirely by federal law. In Lichten 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 82 for example, a federal district court invali-
dated contract provisions that limited Eastem's liability for negligently 
lost or damaged baggage, despite implicit approval of the carrier's 
tariff by the CAB. The court of appeals reversed the district court 
and upheld the liability limitation on the ground that the CAB's aim 
of ensuring fair and uniform airline rates and services could be 
achieved only if the federal regulatory scheme, rather than state 
common law, governed the airline-passenger contract.83 Similarly, 
76. 411 U.S. at 633. 
77. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970). 
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(l) (1970). 
79. 411 U.S. at 638-39. 
80. 411 U.S. at 627. 
81. 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970). 
82. 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). 
83. 189 F.2d at 941. 
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in Mack v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,84 plaintiff passenger sought dam-
ages in tort and contract for the defendant airline's failure, caused 
by adverse weather conditions to transport him the full distance of 
his flight. The court dismissed the action on the ground that the 
state law remedies were preempted by the defendant's tariff, filed 
with the CAB, which limited the airline's liability in such instances.au 
The decisions involving the airline-passenger contract are not 
difficult to reconcile with the Goldstein-Dublino preemption stan-
dards. Air tariff regulation lies at the heart of the CAB's functions, 
and it is likely that inconsistencies and conflicts would arise if the 
states were free to regulate the airline-passenger contract. Contract 
provisions override state laws, of course, only when approved by the 
CAB and when the approval is consistent with the public interest. 
It should not be thought, however, that Congress intended to 
preempt state law applicable to the airline industry simply by enacting 
the FAA and establishing the CAB,86 or that the courts have always 
found preemption to shield the airlines from state law. In two areas, 
personal property taxation and liability for violation of noncontrac-
tual duties, state law has governed. 
The state power to impose personal property taxes on airline 
equipment was considered in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act. In North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,81 for example, the Court upheld a 
state tax imposed on an airline's planes that were based in the state 
and were within the state at least some time during the tax year, while 
in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment, 88 the Court upheld a state's power to tax all planes that 
had sufficient nexus with the state to satisfy due process require-
ments. 89 These decisions are consistent with Goldstein and Dublino, 
since state taxes have an economic impact on airlines but do not in any 
way impinge on the timing, frequency or procedures of airline flights, 
on the CAB's power over the structure and operation of airline 
companies, or on the terms of the airline-passenger and airline-
employee relationships. At some point, an economic burden will 
84. 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1949). 
85. 87 F. Supp. at 115-16. 
86. See note 61 supra. 
87. 322 U.S. 292 (1944). 
88. 347 U.S. 590 (1954). 
89. The prohibition against unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce has led 
the Court to invalidate state tax schemes where double taxation is likely. Compare 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973) (state can tax aircraft fuel 
stored in the state prior to use), with Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929) (state 
cannot tax gasoline loaded on ferrY in another state and consumed during trip through 
the taxing state). 
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frustrate the CAB's power to control air fares, but that burden must 
be of some substance to trigger preemption. 90 
State law also generally governs the liability of airlines both to 
passengers for violations of duties not stipulated directly in the air-
line-passenger contract and to individuals on the ground. Thus in 
Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans,91 the Mississippi 
supreme court concluded that owners of property contiguous to air-
ports could recover under state law, notwithstanding the federal 
regulatory scheme, for property damage.caused by low-flying aircraft. 
Similarly, it is well established that property owners can recover under 
state law for property damage caused by aircraft accidents, 92 that 
airline passengers may bring suit under state law for injuries received 
during a flight, 93 prior to flight while on board the aircraft, 94 and 
while in the airport terminal, 95 and, finally, that the federal regulatory 
scheme does not preclude state wrongful death actions. 96 
In the tort area, the general tests of inconsistency and conflict 
between the Federal Aviation Act and state law will most often fail to 
justify a finding of preemption, particularly under the new standards 
that require more than a mere inference of conflict. In Burbank, the 
Court found preemption where the FAA specifically provided for 
noise regulations and where acquiescence to the state scheme would 
90. The CAB's aims in controlling airfares are the regulation of airline competi-
tion and the promotion of efficient air transportation. See text at notes 56-58 supra. 
State regulations with some economic impact do not frustrate the first aim so long as 
they are applied to all airlines equally. In promoting efficient air service, the CAB 
must consider the validity of airline expenditures to ensure that airlines are not 
accorded a fair rate of return when they are in fact being managed inefficiently. 
State-imposed economic burdens that serve no valid state interests would frustrate 
the goal of efficient air transportation and could legitimately be overridden by the 
CAB. When such burdens do serve valid interests and are not so large or varying 
in amount that the CAB cannot establish reasonable air fares, they should be upheld 
even though they trigger some air fare increases. This conclusion is supported by 
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 
(1972), in which the Court upheld the power of states and municipalities to impose a 
one dollar airport-user charge on enplaning passengers. Because the user charge was 
in addition to the air fare established by the CAB, it was held not to interfere with the 
CAB function of establishing efficient tariffs. Moreover, the charge was challenged 
only on the basis of an alleged repugnancy to the commerce clause, the equal 
protection clause, and the constitutional right to travel, and not on the ground of any 
CAB or FAA preemption. Yet the charge did increase the cost of air travel, and it 
would seem of little importance that the charge was in addition to the air fare rather 
than incorporated within it. 
91. 191 S.2d 126 (1966). 
92. D. BII.LYOU, AIR LAW 87-90 (1964). 
93. See generally Note, The Liability of Airlines for Injuries to Passengers, 31 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 319 (1958). 
94. See sources cited in D. Bn.LYOU, supra note 92, at 99 n.6. 
95. See, e.g., Garrett v. American Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964). 
96. See, e.g., Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. A.H. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 645-48, 
355 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1962). 
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have seriously interfered with the CAB's control over the timing, 
scheduling and patterns of flights. In Lichten and Mack, the courts 
invalidated state laws that attempted to override express contractual 
relations between the airlines and passengers, despite approval of the 
tariffs by the CAB. Air tariff regulation can reasonably be seen as 
lying at the heart of CAB functions. Airline immunity from all 
forms of tort liability, however, cannot easily be inferred from the 
purposes and provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. Vulnerability of 
the lines to liability under state law does not normally interfere with 
the CAB's regulatory functions in the crucial areas of flight opera-
tions and passenger-airline relations, although such liability can have 
an economic impact on the lines, as does imposition of the property 
tax. 
To find preemption of state tort law, something more than an 
inference derived from reviewing the provisions of the FAA and the 
tort law is needed; there must be an affirmative showing that, pur-
suant to its various powers, the CAB has approved explicitly a 
particular liability-creating airline practice or has required the airlines 
to engage in that particular activity.97 Any such action is clearly 
subject to challenge as inconsistent with the public interest, 08 but, if 
valid, the sanction can effectively insulate the practice from state tort 
law liability. 
The CAB can approve airline practices either by accepting the 
terms of the airline-passenger contract found in the tariff or by 
promulgating rules and specifically approving managerial and organi-
zational changes in the course of economic regulation. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that even CAB requirements or approvals are 
often limited in the protection that they afford the airlines and thus 
should not be constructed to preempt all state regulation of the 
subject. 
The fact that the CAB requires an airline to engage in an activity 
often does not protect the airline from liability for the activity. The 
operation of this principle is well illustrated outside the CAB context 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Regents v. Carrol.00 The Federal 
Communications Commission had conditioned the issuance of a li-
cense on the applicant's dissaffirmance of a contract with a third 
party. The applicant did so unilaterally and was sued for breach of 
contract. On review, the Supreme Court concluded that, while the 
FCC was powerless to pass upon the validity of private contracts, the 
97. Section 1106 of the FAA seems to rebut the inference that Congress intended 
to preempt state law applicable to the airline industry simply by enacting the FAA 
and establishing the CAB. See note 61 supra. 
98. In Jackson Municipal Airport, for example, the CAB lacked the power to 
authorize a taking of property without compensation. 191 S.2d at 126. 
99. 338 U.S. 586 (1950). 
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agency could impose such conditions on the issuance of licenses. 
However, the fact that the disaffirmance was required by the FCC, 
the Court emphasized, did not absolve the license applicant from 
breach of contract liability, for it was a fundamental rule of constitu-
tional law that "the imposition of the conditions cannot directly affect 
the applicant's responsibilities (under state law) to a third party 
dealing with the applicant."100 In the CAB context, the Regents 
principle was demonstrated in Jackson Municipal Airport, in which 
the airline flight path that amounted to the "taking" of an easement 
over plaintiff's property had been prescribed by the CAB. The 
defendants, nonetheless, were forced to compensate for the "taking." 
Similarly, CAB rulings that permit an airline to commit a particu-
lar act do not absolve the airline from liability for the manner in 
which the act is committed. In Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, 
lnc.,101 for example, the CAB had approved a corporate acquisition 
on the ground that it was essential to the public interest. The 
approval immunized the parent corporation from antitrust liability 
but did not shield the corporate officers and the corporation's majority 
shareholder from liability for breach of their fiduciary duties to the 
subsidiary and its minority shareholders.102 
Another limitation on the preemptive impact of CAB approvals 
of airline practices arises when the Board, under section 411 of the 
FAA, 103 investigates an allegedly fraudulent and deceptive airline 
practice and finds that there is no need to issue a cease and desist 
order. Arguably, such a finding is tantamount to an approval and 
insulates the activity from state-law liability. Yet this conclusion is 
not consistent with the explicit language of section 1106104 and the 
reluctance of the Supreme Court in recent years to find preemption. 
The purpose of section 411 was not to replace state-law remedies but 
rather to provide the CAB with an additional procedure for regulat-
ing the airlines and protecting the public.100 Since there is no 
necessary overlapping of CAB and state-law definitions of fraud and 
unfair practice, a decision not to enjoin a particular practice is 
dispositive only for the federal remedy, and is not necessarily an 
affirmative agency indication that the practice is in the public's best 
interest and merits immunity from state-law interferenc~. Thus, the 
CAB may decide that a practice in general is not deceptive or 
100. 338 U.S. at 600. 
101. 336 A.2d 572 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
102. See also McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 
1965); Otis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), affd. mem., 
155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). 
103. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). See note 18 supra. 
104. See note 61 supra. 
105. See generally, American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 
U.S. 79, 85 (1956). 
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fraudulent and yet still recognize that it may cause injury to individu-
als. For example, although the CAB has implicitly determined that 
overbooking is not fraudulent or deceptive under section 411, it has 
also recognized that individuals may be injured by overbooking and 
has thus offered bumped passengers either denied boarding compen-
sation as liquidated damages or the right to sue for their state-law 
remedies.106 In short, the refusal of the CAB to issue a cease and 
desist order under 411 does not necessarily constitute the "clear 
manifestation of intention" required to find preemption in the ab-
sence of some actual conflict. 
ill. CAB PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW MISREPRESENTATION 
This section will determine whether state remedies for conceal-
ment of overbooking have been preempted by the FAA or by some 
CAB action. It seems clear that under the Goldstein-Dublino "con-
flict" standards of what constitutes preemption, 107 the tort remedy of 
misrepresentation is not fundamentally inconsistent with the Federal 
Aviation Act. Lack of airline immunity will not undermine the 
purposes of the Act or interfere with the CAB's supervision of flights 
and the airline-passenger relationship. Misrepresentation should be 
treated like other torts that are not automatically invalidated for 
inconsistency with the F AA.108 The focus of this section is therefore 
on whether the CAB has manifested a specific intent to preempt state 
remedies and on whether such preemptive intent is actually within the 
power of the CAB. 
In recognition of the seriousness of the no-show problem for 
airlines, the CAB has reluctantly approved the practice of overbook-
ing.100 In 1962, the CAB accepted the airlines' proposed denied-
boarding compensation tariff for bumped passengers but included a 
caveat that it did not condone deliberate oversales by air carriers. The 
Board also stated that the denied boarding compensation was only an 
alternative to the passengers' right to damages under the common 
law.110 In 1964, the Board affirmed the policy111 but stated that 
106. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 13-14; note 18 supra. 
107. See text at notes 70-74 supra. 
108. See text at notes 91-98 supra. 
109. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8. 
110. CAB Order No. E-18064, 35 CAB 881, 882 (March 1, 1962): ''The Board's 
action in making provision for payment to oversold passengers should not be 
construed as an indication that the Board condones deliberate oversales on the part of 
the air carriers. On the contrary, the proposed plan is designed to provide a measure 
of relief for passengers who are the victims of inadvertancies. Instances of intentional 
oversales will be fully investigated . . . . Moreover, to the extent that the 
proposed tariff provision is designed to restrict a passenger from seeking damages to 
which he would otherwise be entitled under the common law, we find it to be adverse 
to the public interest." 
111. CAB Order No. E-20859 (May 25, 1964). 
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carriers "must continue to seek other solutions" to the no-show 
problem.112 A decade later, the CAB resumed hearings on airline 
reservation practices. While a final Board decision has not yet been 
handed down, the administrative-law judge presiding over the hear-
ings concluded that the current scheme of overbooking, denied board-
ing compensation, and survival of state remedies was not deceptive 
within the meaning of section 411.113 
However, the CAB has never approved or condoned the airline 
practice of concealing overbooking from the public. The Board 
made this fact clear in an amicus brief filed in Nader in which it 
stated that it has yet to determine whether "confirmed reservation 
advertising coupled with nondisclosure of overbooking amounts to an 
unfair or deceptive practice . . . ."114 In 1967, it was proposed 
that airlines be required to inform passengers of an overbooking at 
least twelve hours before flight time. The CAB refused to require 
this type of notification only because it feared that the benefits of such 
notification would be outweighed by its administrative burdens and 
extreme cost.115 Refus~J to require notification cannot reasonably be 
taken as evidence that the CAB approved of concealment. 
Thus, the CAB has not manifested the type of specific intent to 
preempt state laws required by the Goldstein and Dublino decisions. 
The requirement of a specific approval of an industry practice was 
reiterated in Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, lnc.,116 an action 
involving an alleged antitrust violation. As noted above,117 Congress 
has vested the CAB with the power to exempt the airline industry 
from application of the antitrust laws. Yet in Breen Air, the circuit 
- court held that the district court should exercise its jurisdiction be-
cause the agreements allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws had 
never been specifically approved by the Board.118 
112. Id. at 3. 
113. Order of Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert L. Park, Emer-
gency Reservations Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No. 26253 (June 10, 1974), 
included ill CAB Initial Decision, supra note 3. 
114. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 34. 
115. Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8, at 460: "We (the CAB) propose to 
deal with the oversales problem by other means for the following reasons: (1) The 
proposed notice requirement would have necessitated substantial changes in the 
reservation practices and system of carriers, . . . a system which has, on the balance, 
worked reasonably well in the public interest . . . (3) finally, the Board believes the 
oversales problem can be substantially reduced by the proposals herein to require 
carriers (a) to make prompt, effective and adequate compensation to oversold 
passengers, (b) to establish priority rules for determining which passengers holding 
confirmed reserved space shall be denied boarding on oversold flights, and (c) to file 
reports of unaccommodated passengers." 
116. 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972). 
111. See note 61 supra. 
118. As a jurisdictional matter, the court also concluded that the agreements at 
issue were not lawful or arguably lawful, and thus not within the primary jurisdiction 
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Furthermore, the fact that the CAB has implicitly approved 
airline overbooking in no way obviates the need for some showing of 
agency intent to insulate airlines from misrepresentation liability for 
concealment. Instructive analogy can be drawn to the instances 
in which agencies have issued permissive orders that allow regulated 
enterprises to commit a particular act or engage in a specific ac-
tivity, 119 but do not immunize those enterprises from liability for the 
manner in which they commit the act. These decisions suggest that 
CAB approval of overbooking, without more, would not shield air-
lines from liability for the manner in which they engage in overbook-
ing. 
Finally, it should be stressed that even an unambiguous expres-
sion of specific intent by the CAB to preempt state tort law would be 
meaningless if the Board actually lacks the capacity to approve inten-
tional torts such as deliberate misrepresentation. As noted above, 120 
the Board has broad powers to regulate virtually all aspects of airline-
passenger relations. The inability of the CAB to approve tortious 
conduct would derive from the requirement that its actions be in the 
public interest. Yet, the CAB determines in the first instance what 
actions are consistent with the public interest, and its orders are 
upheld on review by the courts of appeals so long as they are 
supported by substantial evidence.121 
Still, it is doubtful that the benefits to the public from conceal-
ment outweigh the harm caused by the practice. On the one hand, 
if the practice of overbooking were publicized, the no-show problem 
might be aggravated by potential customers who would ensure them-
selves against being bumped by making more reservations than they 
could use. On the other hand, overbooking can cause passengers 
considerable inconvenience and harm, as the Nader case demon-
strates. And the possible availability of alternative reservation 
schemes122 to resolve the no-show problem makes resort to tortious 
conduct even more questionable. For example, a number of airlines 
have attempted to deal with no-shows and late cancellations by 
instituting a conditional reservation tariff123 on an experimental basis, 
of the CAB. 470 F.2d at 773-74. For a good discussion of the arguably lawful test, 
see King, The Arguably Lawful Test of Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litigation 
Involving Regulated Industries, 40 TENN. L. R.Ev. 617 ( 1973). 
119. See text at notes 101-102 supra. 
120. See text at notes 56-61 supra. 
121. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1486(a),(e) (1970). 
122. See text at notes 5-6 supra. 
123. Eastern Airlines has established a procedure whereby any passenger may 
obtain "leisure class" or conditional reservations as well as confirmed first class and 
coach reservations. The passenger with a conditional reservation for which regular 
coach fair has been paid is entitled to a preferred stand-by coach seat for his flight; if 
no such coach seat is available, he is given a first class seat; if no seats on his flight 
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although there is no evidence yet as to its effectiveness. It is unlikely 
that the shortcomings of these alternative approaches to the no-show 
problem are sufficiently great to justify the injury caused to individu-
als, and hence to the public interest, by airlines' intentional misrepre-
sentation.124 
are available the passenger may have a refund as well as a free seat on the next 
available flight 
124. In his concurring opinion in Nader, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4808, Justice White 
stated: "It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would have the 
authority to order airline overbooking and to preempt recoveries under state law for 
undisclosed overbooking or for overselling." This Note disagrees with that con-
clusion. 
